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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A. NORMAN GROVER; ARTHUR N. GROVEH;
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FAY G. WIGHT; AMY G. JENSEN; MAX L.
GROVER; JESSE G. PARRY; JOYCE ANNA
G. SMITH and JUNE G. HUFFMAN,
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OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN, h:s
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wife and ARTHUR N. GROVER FARMS INC.
a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.
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11472

ARTHUR N. GROVER FARMS INC.
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
OLEEN GARN and MAXINE B. GARN, his
wife; DARVEL GARN and BONNIE L. GARN,
his wife; and CLIVE GARN and ALOHA GARN,
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASES
The plaintiffs in the above case seek to cancel a contract of sale whereby Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. a
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Utah corporation sold on contract for the sum of

$186,535.00, certain farm lands, water-rights and graz-

ing rights located in the State of Idaho, to the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT

Respondents adopt the statement made by appellants in their brief as to the disposition in lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the appellate court sustain the lower court in its decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We do not agree with plaintiffs' Statement of
Facts. Our Statement of Facts is as follows:
Arthur N. Grover and his wife Estella V. Grover
were the owners of certain dry-farm lands in Idaho in
what is known as Pocatello Valley, just across the Utah
line. They formed a corpora tion known as Arthur N.
Grover Farms Inc. and transferred to their corporation
the title to their lands. They did so under the guidance
of their attorney E. J. Skeen in the year 1963. In order
to comply with the legal requirements of three incorporators, they used the name of Fay G. Wight, one of their
daughters, who resided in the State of California as the
third incorporator. This corporation was formed as
2

shown by the Articles (Exhibit #10) on the 1st day of
.March, 1963. The Articles provided (Article 4) for
authority to issue 100 shares of stock. The stockbook
(Exhibit #g) shows that there were three certificates of
stock issued September 20, 1963. The first certificate
was to Fay G. Wight for one share, the second certificate to Estella V. Grover for 45 shares and the third
certificate for 45 shares to Arthur N. Grover.
The record further shows Fay G. 1Vight did not
receive the certificate of stock for the one share issued
by the corporation (see answer to Interrogatories in
Civil File # 10081 being answer to Interrogatory #I)
until about August, 1965. Also, according to Fay G.
1Vight and Attorney E. J. Skeen, when the corporation
was first organized Fay G. 'Vight, as president of the
corporation, signed in blank for her father (R. 120, 781,
782) all the certificates of stock in the stockbook. This
would then make it possible for her parents to issue stock
to whomever they wanted, without contacting her. By
this act she literally placed the full control of the corporation in the hands of her father and mother because
they had a stock book signed completely in blank by their
daughter Fay G. 'Vight, as president. The one share to
the daughter was not delivered to her. Her certificate
could be canceled at any time and a new certificate issued by the use of the blank certificates that she had
signed and left with her parents.
Thereafter the father filed with the Secretary of
State. pursuant to Section 16-10-121 of the Utah Busi-

3

ness Corporation Act, the first annual report on the 2nd
day of March, 1964. This was signed by him before a
notary, being Nancy Lee Bishop the secretary of E. J.
Skeen the attorney who had prepared the Articles of
Incorporation (Defendants' Exhibit #10). This affidavit stated that 91 shares of stock had been issued as of
that date. He again, on August 2nd, 1965, filed a second
annual report under oath setting out that 92 shares had
been issued in said corporation as of that date. The
stockbook does not agree with these affidavits. The first
three certificates equal 91 shares. These three certificates would equal the number of shares claimed issued
on the first annual report as of March 2nd, 1964, filed
with the Secretary of State. However, the stockbook
certificate #4 shows one share of stock issued to Leonard
Grover dated September 24, 1963. Certificate #5 shows
one share of stock issued to Dr. Floyd E. Grover dated
September 24, 1963. Certificate #6 shows one share of
stock issued to Amy G. Jensen dated September 24,
1963. Certificate #7 shows one share of stock issued to
A. Norman Grover dated September 24, 1963. Certificate #8 shows one share of stock issued to Max L. Grover dated September 24, 1963. Certificate #10 shows one
share of stock issued to Joyce Anna Smith dated September 24, 1963. These certificates so issued make a
total of 98 shares issued, all in the month of September,
1963, when the affidavits filed under oath show 91
shares as of March, 1964, and 92 shares as of August,
1965.
The court found (R. 880, 881) that no stock was
4

owned by other than the father and mother on the date
of sale to the defendants Garn, to-wit: October lst
'
1964, which supported the contention of the defendant
that the certificates shown issued in the stockbook were
made up at a later date and back-dated for the purpose
of assisting the plaintiffs in their cause of action.
A close examination of the stock book (Exhibit #9)
shows there are only stubs for twenty-three certificates,
a peculiar number for a bound stockbook. Also, in the
binding in the back there appears to show a small part
of a stub still remaining after the major portion of it
has been torn out. Also, certificate number 19 is dated
l\fay 16, 1964, while certificates numbers 11 to 18 inclusive, are dated July 16, 1964, which further indicates
someone was mixed-up when this stockbook manipulation was attempted .
.Mr. Grover had farmed this property alone or with
the aid of tenants for many years prior to the year 1964.
However he had decided to sell, and had listed his property for sale on the 22nd day of October, 1963 (Exhibit
#31). He had also told other people about his desire to
sell this property, one of whom was Charles Wood ( R.
6, 226, 227) and as a result of this information Oleen
Garn, one of the defendants, went to see the property in
Idaho and met Arthur N. Grover upon the property.
This occurred in September of 1964 ( R. 7).
Mr. Grover showed Oleen Garn over the property
and quoted him certain prices (R. 8). They arranged a
second meeting and .Mr. Garn and his two sons, the
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other two named defendants in this law suit, returned
and were shown the Grover property by .Mr. Grover.
Again, they discussed a purchase price of $140.00 per
acre for the tillable dry-farm ground which had been previously placed in crop. l\Ir. Grover asked no down payment but did request an annual payment. A $15,000.00
figure was discussed which would include the range
ground, water and Taylor Grazing rights. The Garns
could have borrowed the money and paid him in full in
one payment, but he stated his attorney had advised him
to sell it in the manner he outlined. Mr. Grover said he
wanted a low rate of interest, 3%, and a high price per
acre for tax purposes. He also said he wanted his payments based upon one half (1/2) of the crop. He asked
for a down payment of only $10.00 to show good faith.
Mr. Grover was to go back to Salt Lake and have his
attorney draw up a contract of sale and the Garns were
to meet him in the office of the First Security Bank in
Brigham City, Utah (R. 9, 11, 12, 533, 537, 625, 626,
627, 628, 629, 630, Exhibit 40).
A working copy of some agreement was later taken
by Mr. Grover to the :First Security Bank where Mr.
J. Leo Nelson, one of the officers, met with Mr. Grover
and the Garns and the terms of the first contract prepared by the Attorney for l\fr. Grover, E. J. Skeen,
were discussed. There was also discussion about the
property being owned by a corporation, and, the fact
that the corporation had 91 shares of stock issued, 45
shares to Mr. Grover, 45 shares to Mrs. Grover and one
share to a daughter named Fay G. Wight. Mr. Grover,
6

at that time, appeared very alert, and fully able to understand what he was doing and saying.
This first contract had no minimum payment provided in the contract, and on the advice of the banker
there were some changes made. Mr. Grover said he
wanted to convey 120 acres of the land to a daughter,
and as this was agreeable to all parties the contract was
taken back to .Mr. Grover's attorney E. J. Skeen, to
make the final corrections. It was then to be returne<l
for signatures.
On the 26th day of September, 1964, .Mr. Grover
either drove or had somneone drive him to the Garns'
home in Fielding, where he presented to the three Garns
a contract which he had apparently had prepared and
requested the Garns to sign it, which they did. He said
that Mr. Skeen was out of his office and the final draft
was not finished but he wanted this signed while awaiting the final draft (Exhibit 33, R. 12, 13, 14, 15, 540,
542, 543, 544, 546, 547, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635 and 636).
On or about the 1st day of October, 1964, the Garns
were advised by .Mr. Grover to come to the First Security Bank at Brigham City, for the purpose of signing
the contract of sale. When the Garns arrived, Norman
Grover, a son of Arthur N. Grover, was in the back room
of the bank with his father. 'Vhen the father came out
of the back room with Norman Grover, Norman Grover
left without talking to the Ganrs. (R. 18, 19, 351, 548,
549, 637.) The contract which had been made up in Attorney Skeen's office (Exhibit #3) and two warranty
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deeds of conveyance also f'repared in the same office
and notarized by Nancy Lee Bishop, the secretary of
Attorney Skeen, were al~o there (Exhibits 2 and 5) as
well as an escrow agreement prepared on a different
typewriter (Exhibit # 1) . Present were Arthur N.
Grover, the three Garns and their wives and J. Leo N elson the banker. Estella V. Grover was not present but
the instruments which required her signature had been
previously signed by her (R. 20, 21, 22, 23, 553, 638,
639).
The escrow agreement (Exhibit # 1) provided on its reverse side that after the payment of
certain charges the balance of any payments on said
contract would be credited to the account of Arthur
N. Grover and Estella V. Grover. Obviously the
money to be paid to the Grovers was requested to be
made available to them individually, just as though there
were no corporation in existence. The legal instruments
were all signed at that time at the First Security Bank
by the Garns and Arthur N. Grover and were left in
escrow with the bank ( R. 18) on or about October 1st,
1964.
Arthur N. Grover was so pleased with this sale that he
sent a check in the sum of $500.00 marked "in appreciation" to Charles Wood (R. 228) because Mr. Wood had
referred the Garns to him to make the sale.
Various members of the Grover family came to the
farm in August of 1965, one year after the date of the
sale (R. 41, 42) and Mr. Grover was with them. All
were happy regarding the sale to the Garns.
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The first defector was Norman Grover. He met
Darvel Garn after contracts had been executed and the
Garns had gone into possession and were planting wheat
in October of 1964. (R. 639, 640, 641). He wanted them
to move off. The following spring Norman Grover and
his brother Max, went to the farm (R. 37, 38, 39, 353,
354, 355) and demanded the Garns walk off. He followed this up with a meeting at the Cross Roads Service
Station east of Tremonton, Utah, where he met the
father, Oleen Garn, in September of 1965 (R. 55, 356,
357). He admitted he didn't have any stock in the corporation but said he was representing his father, Arthur
N. Grover, and they were going to take the farm back
and kick the Garns off. He followed this up with a meeting a month later at the same place. This was called at
his request. This time there was present Oleen Garn,
his son, Clive Garn and Norman Grover (R. 56, 57,
359, 360, 566, 567). At this meeting Norman Grover
was confronted with the fact that at the prior meeting he
said he owned no stock and that he was just representing his father, Arthur N. Grover and to that Norman
Grover replied:
"That's the way it was then, but it's not the
case now and if you don't get off we're going to
take legal action and throw you off."
Evidently the new stock issue shown in the stockbook
took place between these two meetings in October and
November of 1965.
Between these two meetings mentioned above another meeting took place during October, 1965, at the
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request of the father, Arthur N. Grover, at hi~ home in
Salt Lake City (R. 58, 59, 562, 563, 564, 641, 642, 643).
There he had a paper to read to the Garns claiming in
substance that the income tax on the sale would cost him
from $130,000.00 to $140,000.00 according to his son,
Norman Grover, and that he would have to take the
farm back. At this meeting Estella V. Grover served
some ice cream and showed the lady folks some pictures.
A new meeting was set up at the First Security Bank in
Brigham City, the following Monday (R. 60, 563, 644).
Norman Grover was there with hi~ father and claimed
his father would have to pay $140,000.00 in taxes on the
sale. The Grovers refused to have an attorney come in
and determine the amount of tax. The meeting broke up.
On December 31, 1965, Norman Grover filed Civil
Action #10038 on the Garns. He had contacted Attorney Skeen (R. 361) and Attorney Skeen prepared the
complaint for Norman Grover (R. 395, 396, 397) but
for some reason did not sign it as the attorney. 'Vhile
he had personally prepared the original contract for the
sale of Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. and had advised
Mr. Arthur N. Grover during the negotiations, he at
this time alleged in the complaint that the price was so
inadequate and the interest rate so low that the sale was
unconscionable and unfair to the seller (R. 396). However that same complaint prepared by E. J. Skeen (R.
845) for Norman Grover did not allege any incompetency on the part of either Arthur N. Grover or Estella
V. Grover (R. 845, 846, 847).
At the time of the trial, Attorney Clifford L. Ash10

ton made a great attempt to have Arthur N. Grover,
one of his clients who was also the secretary-treasurer
of the corporation at the time of sale, brought in as an
adverse witness, (R. 70, 71, 73) alleging incompetency.
There was considerable argument on this point so the
court called him as its witness. Then Attorney Ashton
immediately guided this witness into a claimed incident
(R. 76) which was supposed to have taken place on September 26, 1964. It was claimed that Mr. Arthur N.
Grover had tried to crank a tractor and had blacked out
when either the tractor backfired and the crank hit him
or he had suffered a heart attack. He claimed he laid
there six or seven hours before his son-in-law, who was
deceased at the time of trial, found him (R. 77). He also
claimed that he was paralyzed from his waist down, that
the son-in-law found his tonic that he kept on hand and
gave it to him and that he bathed his legs in cold water,
then in alcohol for three hours and then in the evening
took him to Salt Lake City. He also claimed that on
the following day Oleen Garn telephoned Arthur N·
Grover (R. 78) and said he had heard that Mr. Garn
wanted to sell his property.
Relying on this claimed injury which could not be
supported by any other evidence except the statement
of Arthur N. Grover who claimed that this injury took
place on September 26, 1964, two doctors were presented by plaintiffs. The first was Dr. Thomas E. Robinson
of Salt Lake City and he was asked (R. 283):
"Q. And in October of 1964 did he come to you
relating an incident of unconsciousness?
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A. I think it was October. It was in that region
or that area of time, at least, when he did."
Then Attorney Ashton as the record from there on will
show, attempted to use this doctor based on this incident,
to show possible incompetentcy. When the doctor was
cro~s-examined he was asked to produce his office book
to establish the date of any office calls 05 treatments (R.
297) and he said he left it at home. He admitted he expected to be cross-examined on this date.
The other doctor was Dr. J. Gordon Felt. He never
had Arthur N. Grover as a patient until May 15th, 1967
( R. 315) but claims he was at a social party at Norman
Grovers place at one time and Mr. Grover related the
incident of him blacking out (R. 314). The very date
that this incident was supposed to have taken place, towit: September 26, 1964 (R. 77) Arthur N. Grover delivered to the three Garns in Fielding, Utah (Exhibit
#33) being a brief typed contract dated that date which
he wanted signed to bind up the agreement until Mr.
Skeen, his attorney, could complete the final document.
All four people signed it that day (R. 544, 545, 546,
547' 634, 635, 636) .
Since the signing of this contract Mr. Grover has
filed a law suit entitled "Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc.
vs. F. P. Nielson & Sons," Civil #9945 filed August 9,
1965, with E. J. Skeen, at'torney for plaintiff. Answers
to certain interrogatories are signed by Arthur N. Grover before a notary E. J. Skeen as of September 10, 1965,
and are of record in said action.
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Neighbors and business associates who had know1:
Mr. Grover for many years testified to his competency
to-wit: Junior Lish, who had known him since 1956 (IL
409) and had hauled his grain which was in storage in
Blue Creek, to market in 1965 (R. 411). Mr. Grover
went with him with each load until approximately
15,000 bushels were hauled. Mr. Grover told him (R.
412, 413, 414) of how happy he was to have made a sale
to the Garns. He also said he could not get any of his
children to help him, including Norman Grover (R.
416, 417) so that is why he decided to sell the farm.
J. Leo Nelson who was Arthur N. Grover's banker
had known him for over 20 years (R. 441). In the fall of
1964 Mr. Grover said he was going to sell his farm and
Mr. Nelson asked him why he didn't sell it to his son
Norman and he said "I can't deal with Norm" ( R. 441) .
Mr. Nelson testified that Mr. Grover appeared to fully
understand each and every part of what was taking place
when the contract was signed (R. 452, 453, 454, 455)
and he even loaned him money !)ince the execution of the
agreement.
Ernest Brenkman an employee of F. P. Nielson &
Sons had known Arthur N. Grover for 28 years (R.
615), while running a wheat elevator and during those
times had dealt with Mr. Grover on numerous occasions.
He purchased grain from him in May, 1965. Mr. Brenkman said (R. 617):
"A. To the best of my knowledge, with my associations prior to this, he seemed about the
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same spirits, same type of gentleman we'd
always done business with before."
Voylet Grover, sister-in-law had known Arthur N.
Grover for more than 52 years (R. 685). She attended a
family reunion in 1965 where Arthur N. Grover was
present in July of that year (R. 686). He mentioned
about the sale of his farm to the Garns and how happy
he was about it. She considered him competent, (R. 687,
688, 689, 690). Each and all of the Garns considered
him competent.
From these facts, the court found:
Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. was incorporated
March 1st, 1963, with 100 shares of stock authorized.
That Arthur N. Grover owned 45 shares of issued stock
and Estella V. Grover owned 45 shares of issued stock.
One share of stock was issued to Fay G. Wight but not
delivered until August of 1965. That Fay G. Wight
as president and signed the stockbook in blank and delivered it to Arthur N. Grover ( R. 878) . That Arthur N.
Grover and Estella V. Grover are the father and mother
of all the Grover plaintiffs. That no stock had been issued to any of them except Fay G. Wight, prior to August of 1965 and none was delivered to any of them prior
to said date (R. 879). That besides the real estate that
had been conveyed to the corporation Arthur N. Grover
owned personally 50 shares of Lone Spring Water Co.,
stock being one half interest in said company, 50 shares
or rights to graze 50 head under the Taylor Grazing
permits and certain machinery and equipment (R. 880).
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That Arthur N. Grover and b:;Lelln \T. Grover for
them~elves as secretary-treasurer and vice-president
and for in behalf of Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc·
entered into a contract of sale of certain real property
with the Garns on certain terms and conditions set out
in said contract (R. 880). That said sale was authorized
by all stockholders of said corporation who had stock
issued and in their possession.
That Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover
were using the corporation to carry out their private
purposes. That said corporation was formed for the purpose of buying, selling and dealing in real property (R.
880) . That in August, 1965, the children met with their
parents and induced them to issue stock to them and
back-date the same to show them as stockholders prior
to the contract date of sale, to-wit: October 1st, 1964.
That stockholders meeting were then held wherein a
claimed resolution was passed but not reduced to writing, claiming the stockholders were not notified of the
sale prior to its execution (R. 881). That the only shares
issued and in the possession of any parties prior to August 2, 1965, were 45 shares each to Arthur N. Grover
and Estella V. Grover (R. 882). That the children of
Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover had no stock
in their possession prior to August 2, 1965, and had no
standing to file a class action as stockholders to attack
the contract of sale of October 1st, 1964 (R. 882). That
the contracts of sale and deeds were signed by the owners of said corpora tion and placed in escrow ( R. 882) .
That the Arthur N. Grover Corporation by its officers,
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agreed to deposit water stock certificates and grazing
rights with escrow holder (R. 883) which have not been
deposited. That the escrow agreement provided that the
funds, when paid, were to be transferred to the private
individual accounts of Arthur N. Grover and Estella V.
Grover ( R. 883). That the sale was made in keeping
with the purposes of the corporation (R. 883). That the
defendants have altered their position because of said
sale by buying equipment and have paid all sums that
through time have become due prior to the due date (R.
884). That the contract provided that if either party
had to employ counsel to enforce the provisions of the
contract the defaulting party should pay reasonable attorneys fees and $5,000.00 was fixed as attorneys fees.
That no notice was ever given to the defendants prior
to the contract date that either Arthur N. Grover or
Estella V. Grover had no authority to enter into said
contract ( R. 884) . That on date of sale both Arthur N.
Grover and Estella V. Grover possessed sufficient mental capacity to so enter into said agreement, fully understood and exercised their own free will and were physically and mentally capable of understanding and appreciating the nature and effect of the agreement. That
the price per acre was higher than other sales but the
interest rate was lower for a tax benefit. That any
changes in the contract were made by E. J. Skeen, attorney for plaintiffs (R. 885). That the contract was
not inadequate as to price. That said sale was not done
in the manner as outlined by Section 16-10-74 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, but said contract
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was not void nor of no force or effect because all of the
stockholders of said corporation entered into and signed
said contract and said corporation is now estopped to
now assert that the acts of its stockholders are not binding on said corporation. That Arthur N. Grover and
Estella V. Grover had the advice of counsel at all times.
That there was no imposition of any other persons will
upon the Grovers. That no fraud, deceit or undue influence was practiced upon them (R. 887).
The court concluded that the Arthur N. Grover
Farms Inc. was but the instrumentality through which
Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, for convenience, transacted their business. It pierced the corporate
veil and concluded that any statutes relating to corporations and particularly to meetings of stockholders were
either complied with or waived when the owners of the
stock of said corporation entered into said contract. That
the corporation and Arthur N. Grover and Estella V.
Grover, individually, are bound by the contract entered
into October 1st, 1964 (R. 888) and an appropriate decree was entered.

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS VALID
BECAUSE IT 'i\T AS AUTHORIZED BY ALL
OF THE STOCKHOLDERS 'VHO ':VERE
THE ACTUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
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POINT II
THE CORPORATION
SHOULD BE
ES TOPPED FROM DENYING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT.
POINT III
THE GROVERS USED THE CORPORATION FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL PURPOSES, ARE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT
OF SALE, DID EXECUTE IT NOT ONLY AS
INDIVIDUALS BUT ALSO AS OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS AND ARE PERSONALLY
LIABLE UNDER IT.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS
PREPARED BY THE GROVERS AND THEIR
ATTORNEY.
POINT V
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
AND
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS VALID
BECAUSE IT \VAS AUTHORIZED :UY ALL
OF THE STOCKHOLDERS \VHO \VERE
THE ACTUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
POINT II
THE
CORPORATION
SHOULD
BE
ESTOPPED FRO.M DENYING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT.
POINT III
THE GROVERS USED THE CORPORATION FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL PURPOSES, ARE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT
OF SALE, DID EXECUTE IT NOT ONLY AS
INDIVIDUALS BUT ALSO AS OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS AND ARE PERSONALLY
LIABLE UNDER IT.
Points I, II and III are so interrelated that we shall
discuss them together in order to avoid repetition.
The essence of Points I, II and III is the fact that
we are dealing with a "family corporation." Specifically,
a corporation whose entire assets were transferred to it
by Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, his wife,
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in exchange for ninety ( 90 l shares of stock (Findings
of Fact No. 1). This represented all of the stockholders
of the corporation who had stock issued and in their
possession at the time (October 1, 1964) the contract of
sale in question was entered into (Findings of Fact No.
6). There was only one other share of stock that had
been issued by the corporation a.pd that had been issued
to Fay G. Wight, a daughter, for no consideration and
the possession of said certificate of stock was not delivered to Fay G. Wight until August, 1965, (Findings
of Fact No. 1 and No. 6). It can thus be seen that the
contract of sale was authorized and entered into by the
holders of all of the stock of the corporation (Findings
of Fact 19 (a) and 19 (b).
We are not dealing with a "public corporation"
having numerous !)tockholders. It is this distinction between the small closed family corporation and the large
public corporation having many stockholders that the
appellants choose to ignore. We are here dealing with a
corporation that is nothing more than the alter-ego of
the individuals or a mere shell covering the real parties
in interest. Consequently we wish to confine the argument to cases of this kind and support it with cases that
are in point with the case now before the court.
In the case of Russell vs. Golden Rule Mining
Company 159 P2d 776, it appears that certain parties
entered into some agreements to purchase some mining
claims with the right 'to install certain machinery. The
machinery so installed would become the property of
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sellers if default took place. After a period of time and
after additional contracting had been done, a corporation was formed with assignments of the contracts to the
corporation. 'Vhen default occurred, the principal stockholder who held a majority of the stock directed certain
legal action to proceed in behalf of said corporation. He
did so without a meeting of the stockholders. The court
said on page 785, left-hand column:
" ... A stockholder may maintain a suit on
behalf of the corporation. Such suit may be instituted without a previous demand if it appears
that such a demand on the corporation would be
useless or unavailing . . . Furthermore, while
the old rule WrM otherwise, it is now held that
'the trend of authority is to uphold as binding
on the corporation acts or contracts on its behalf
by a person or persons owning all or practically
all of the stock, even though there is a lack of,
or defect in, some corporate step, or action'. 19
C.J.S. Corporations p. 472 Art. 1004." (emphasis added)
'Ve say that a calling of a meeting of the stockholders, Arthur N. Grover ( 45 shares) Estella V.
Grover ( 45 shares and Fay G. 'Vight (one share) to
pass a resolution authorizing the sale is a "useless" act.
'Ve also say that when two people owning 90 shares out
of 91 shares, enter into a contract of sale for the corporation, it is binding on the corporation "even though there
is a lack of, or defect in, some corporate step or action."
The case of Henry Building Cornpany vs. Cowman, 363 P2d 208 (Okl) is a case of a real estate broker
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bringing action against two corporations for a broker's
commission for procuring a purchaser for an apartment
building owned by the corporations. The corporations
defended on the ground that the contract had not been
entered into by a formal act of the directors as provided
by statute. On page 212 right-hand column, the court
stated:
" ... In her (The plaintiff's) amendment to
petition she alleged that C. H. Henry told her
that the corporations were family corporations
and that he and his wife, .May Henry, owned the
corporations and all of the stock of the corporations.
"Under 18 O.S., 1951 Art. 1.34 supra, and
under the general rule in external dealings with
third persons a corporation exercises its powers
by and through its board of directors. 19 C.J.S.
Corporations Arts. 999 and 1000, pages 463 and
464. However, there are exceptions to the rule.
In 19 C.J.S. Corporations Art. 1004, page 471,
it is said: ... ''but the trend of authority is to
uphold as binding on the corporation acts or
contracts on its behalf by a person or persons
owning all or practically all of the stock . . . '
"In W enban Estate Inc. vs. Hewlett et al,

193 Cal 675, 227 P.723, 731, the Supreme Court

of California said :

'Accordingly it has been held that upon a sufficient showing that a corporation is but the instrumentality through which an individual, who
is the sole owner of all of the corporate capital
stock, for convenience transacts his business,
equity, looking to the substance rather than the
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form of the relation, and the law as well will
hold such corporation obligated for the a~ts of
the sole owner of the corporation to the same
extent and just as he would be bound in the absence of the existence of the corporation.' (emphasis added)
"In the body of tthe opinion in l\Iid-Continent
Life Insurance Co. v. Goforth, 193 Okl. 314,
143 P2d 154, 157, this court said: 'It is the general rule that a corporation is an entity separate
and apart from the persons composing it, but
the rule has its limitations. Both law and equity,
when necessary to circumvent fraud, protect the
rights of third persons, and accomplish justice,
disregard the distinct existence and treat them as
identical.'
See also 13 Am. Jur. Corporations, Art. 7,
page 160, to the same effect."
Consequently we say that in this case Arthur N.
Grover owned 45 shares of stock, Estella V. Grover
owned 45 shares of stock and Fay G. Wight owned one
share but she had never received delivery of that one
share prior to the sale (see her answers to interrogatories). She had endorsed the stock certificates in blank
for the benefit of her father and he held the stock book
with her signing in blank all of the stock certificates,
giving him and his wife absolute control of the corporation. The corporation had been created by Mr. and Mrs.
Grover for the express purpose of handling their own
property. The property in the corporation was only the
property that they themselves had accumulated over a
lifetime. The one share to the girl had not been delivered
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to her. The parents had absolute control over the corporation.
New, let's refer again to Wenban Estate Inc. vs.
Hewlett 227 P. 723. I fall back to this case bacause there
are a whole line of cases that follow the thinking of this
decision and we are nearly exactly in line with the facts
in it. In the 1Venban Estate v. Hewlett) page 728 lefthand column in the next to the last paragraph, it reads:
" ... In June, 1908, upon the advice of Hewlett, the corporation was formed for the express
purpose of taking over, managing, and developing the properties of Caroline S. Wenban.
"At the time the corporation was organized

9,995 shares of its 10,000 shares of corporate

capital stock were issued direct to Caroline S.
"\V enban. The remaining 5 shares were issued in
order to qualify directors, I share to Caroline S.
Wenban, I share to her daughter, Eva Shaw, I
share to her daughter, Flora Wenban l\iills, I
to her business agent, George \V. Merrill, and I
share to defendant Eugene Hewlett. These
shares were shortly thereafter indorsed by the
persons to whom they were originally issued over
to and delivered to Caroline S. "\Venban, who has
ever since held them as sole owner. She controlled
the corporation in all of its actions, and the officers of the corporation, who were members of
her family, did whatever she wanted them to do
with regard to the corporation."
Again on page 731 right-hand column, it reads:
" ... That the corporation was looked upon as
the alter ego of Caroline S. "\Venban is evidenced
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by the acquiescence of the other directors of the
corporation in her conduct whereby she treated
the bonds of the corporation as her own. In such
a situation her responsibility as the sole shareholder of the corporation, when dealing with the
assets of the corporation, was the corporation's
responsibility, and conversely the obligation of
the corporation in this particular situation is her
obligation."
Now, I have shown this for the reason that in our
case when the contract was filed with the escrow holder,
the First Security Bank, the contract provided that all
of the payments that were made on the sale of the property by the corporation, were to be transferred into the
personal accounts of Mr. and Mrs. Grover. Again, we
have proof that the corporation is just the alter-ego of
Mr. and Mrs. Grover and was set up to serve their individual purposes. Let's take another quote from this
same case, found on page 731 in the middle of the page,
which reads:
"'i\Thile it is the general rule that a corporation
is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, with separate, distinct liabilities and obligations, nevertheless there is a well-recognized
and firmly settled exception to this general rule,
that, when necessary to redress fraud, protect
the rights of third persons, or prevent a palpable
injustice, the law and equity will intervene and
cast aside the legal fiction of independent corporate existence, as distinguished from those who
hold and own the corporate capital stock, and deal
with the corporation and stockholders as identical
entities with identical duties and obligations.
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"Accordingly it has been held that upon a sufficient showing that a corporation is but the instrumentality through which an individual, who
is the sole owner of all the corporate capital stock,
for convenience transacts his business, equity,
looking to the substance rather than the form of
the relation, and the law as well, will hold such
corporation obligated for the acts of the sole
owner of the corporation to the same extent and
just as he would be bound in the absence of the
existence of the corporation .... "
The vVenban case has been cited as authority by
the California courts and other state courts on many,
many occasions. One of the most recent decisions citing
this W enban case is the 1964 California case of Brunzell
Construction Company Inc. vs. Harrahs Club 37 Cal
Rptr, 659. There Harrah's Club was sued for breach of
contract and other causes of action and the court found
that Harrah's Club was really only a one man corporation and the alter ego of the owner. The court held that
the corporate shell must be disregarded in order to effectuate justice. On page 665 in the right-hand column,
it reads:
" . . Under our law where one person owns
all of the stock of a corporation and uses the corporation as a mere conduit for the transaction of
his own business, the corporation is regarded as
his 'alter ego'."
Then it cites several California cases and further states:
"To adhere to the separate corporate entity
theory in this case would be nothing short of placing a judicial stamp of approval upon an appar-
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ent fraud - here the whole structure of the various enterprises is transparent .... "
In another recent California case, Taylor vs. Newton,
257 P2d 68 ( 1953) it was re-emphasized that the distinct entity of a corporation will be disregarded in order
to achieve justice and to prevent fraud. It was said on
page 72, left-hand column:
" ... 'It is the law in California as elsewhere
that, although a corporation is usually regarded
as an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, both law and equity will, when necessary
to circumvent fraud, protect the rights of third
persons and accomplish justice, disregard this
distinct existence and treat them as identical.'
The issue is not so much whether, for all purposes, the corporation is the 'alter-ego' of its
stockholders or officers, nor whether the very
purpose of the organization of the corporation
was to defraud the individual who is now in court
complaining, as it is an issue of whether in the
particular case presented and for the purposes
of such case justice and equity can best be accomplished and fraud and unfairness defeated by a
disregard of the distinct entity of the corporate
form."

All of these authorities go to the very point that we
wish to impress strongly here and that is, that if the
Grovers were allowed to deny the fact that their corporation was merely their alter ego, this court would be
allowing a stamp of approval upon a fraud because
clearly the Grover Corporation was formed for the very
purpose of protecting the property of the two shareholders of the corporation. To allow these shareholders
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to hide behind the corporate entity and be given greater
rights because of this corporate existence, would be to
allow an injustice to occur, because enforcing the letter
of the law would defeat the very spirit of the law. This
is further emphasized in Fletcher's Encyclopedia on
Corporations, Vol. 1 pp. 134, 136 and 165. The California courts have repeatedly held that this doctrine of
disregarding the corporate mask in searching to see who
is the real party in interest, does not depend upon the
presence of actual fraud. The recent California case of
Talbot v. Fresno Pacific Corporation, 5 Cal,Rptr, 361,
stated that very point and added:

"It is designed to avoid or prevent what would
be fraud or injustice, if accomplished."
If there is any question as to when the courts should
ignore the corporate veil and pierce it to see who are the
real parties in interest, the California courts have also
given us a good definition of that in the case of Minifie
v. Rowley, 187 Calif. 481, 202 P.673. The first test is
that the individual not only influences and governs the
corporation but there is such a unity of interest and
ownership that the individuality or separateness of the
person or the corporation has ceased. Second that the
facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of a separate existence of the corporation would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice. There can be no question but what those two
criteria have been met in our case. Here the individuals
had such a unity with the corporation that the corpora-
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tion and the stockholders were one. And, certainly the
second criteria is present, that if the court did not disregard the fact that the plaintiffs and the corporation
are one, it would promote an injustice.
Now, let us look at the sections of the statutes
themselves. We believe that Section 16-10-74, UCA
1953, as amended which is the section which the plaintiffs want to hang their hat on, is really controlled by
Section 16-10-6, UCA 1953 as amended, under the
heading of Defense of Ultra Vires. This section provides that:
"No act of a corporation and no conveyance or
transfer of real or personal property to or by a
corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact
that the corporation was without capacity or
power to do such act or to make or receive such
conveyance or trans f er, ... "
Mr. Ashton always has claimed that this section has no
reference at all to Section 16-10-74. However, we note
that as a footnote to this section the editor has referenced
it to 58 ALR 2d 784:
"Who may assert invalidity of sale, mortgage,
or other disposition of corporate property without approval of stockholders."
This ALR reference states in a preliminary section at
page 786:
"Statutes commonly require stockholder approval of alienations of the property of corporations. Sometimes they relate to transfers of all or
"
substantially all of the corporate assets;
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In other words, the editors of the Utah Code Annotated have reference under 16-10-6 the very matters
controlling the provisions of 16-10-7 4 and the interesting thing in this, is that on page 788 of the ALR Annotation they have included a section under the heading:
"General Rule that Statute is for Benefit of Stockholders Only" - "Who May Assert Invalidity of
Transfer." In Section 3, Stockholders, it reads:

"It is generally recognized that a charter or
general statute requiring the consent of a percentage of the stockholders to validate a sale,
mortgage, or other disposition of corporate property is intended primarily for the benefit of the
stockholders, and it has been held or recognized
in many decisions that only they can complain of
the failure of the corporation to comply with this
requirement."
Now, if this be the case that on the 1st day of October, 1964, there were 91 shares of stock issued with
45 belonging to the father and another 45 belonging to
the mother and one share was issued to a daughter, but
not delivered and the daughter had been willing to sign
in blank the stock certificate book so the father and
mother could handle their property as they saw fit, then
the father and mother, Arthur N. Grover and Estella V.
Grover, are the only persons who have any right to appear in court and assert any claim or objection under
the statute. And, inasmuch as they own all of the stock,
equity would not let them hide behind that statute and
complain because they personally executed the documents themselves.
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Also there is an important distinction between a
large widely-held corporation with many stockholders
and this type of family corporation where the stock is
held by the heads of the family and the corporation is
created and formed to carry out their purposes. They
are not considered the same by the law as corporations
which are commercial in character and have numerous
stockholders and operate as big business.
I think if the court will look at the cases cited by
the plaintiff it will find that each and all of the cases
involve large corporations with many shares of stock
outstanding. I think it will also find that the action
involved in those cases was between the stockholders
who were attempting to restrain or enjoin and was not
one in rescission. I believe it will be found in each
instance that the act had not been executed but was
threatened and the position of the parties had not
changed. Now, with this thought in mind we want to
cite to the court a number of additional cases.
Dealing with the issue of the statutory requirement
that a corporation cannot sell its assets until there has
been a meeting of the shareholders to grant authority
to the directors to sell said assets, it should first be
stated that the common law rule was very similar. The
common law rule stated that the directors had no
authority to sell the assets of a corporation until the
shareholders gave their approval. The Utah statute
in question, Section 16-10-74 UCA 1953 as amended,
merely codifies the common law rule but it is the rea-
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soning behind the statute which is important, and the
policy which is sought to be enforced. From an examination of this we can determine what was the intent
of the statute. Certainly the same philosophy which
caused common law judges to develop this rule is the
same which prompted the creators of the Model Business Corporation Act to provide the similar provision
which is an attempt to protect the shareholders from
irresponsible acts of the directors or from acts which
would benefit the directors at the expense of the shareholders.
But, as in all rules, some exceptions were developed.
Both the common law and the other state statutes have
allowed exceptions which stated that where the directors
of a corporation own all or nearly all of the outstanding
stock, then the acts of these individuals can be construed to be the acts of the shareholders and with the
consent of the shareholders; any other interpretation
of such a rule would be to place form over substance.
To allow a strict interpretation of the law would
defeat the letter and purpose of the law. A long line
of California cases have expressed such a theory. One
case directly in point is that of Halbert vs. Berlinger,
273 P2d 27 4, 1954 case. In this case a husband and
wife owned all of the corporation's stock. The wife took
no part in the corporation's management and the husband was the president and executive officer of the
corporation. The husband was more than a mere agent
and his acts as president, in furthering the objectives
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of the corporation, were binding upon the corporation
itself. In that case the corporation president was piloting a plane which crashed and a passenger was killed.
The plaintiff in this action sued the corporation for
negligence. The jury found the corporation president
was acting in pursuance of the corporation interests
and therefore represented the corporation and was not
a mere agent. On appeal the court held that the jury
could reasonably infer that the corporation president
had unrestricted and unlimited authority to act for the
corporation in furthering its objectives. In our case
it is clear that the executive secretary of the corporation, 1\-lr. Grover, was acting in pursuance of the corporation's interests and he and his wife owned all of
the stock so any acts he performs in his official capacity
must be binding upon the corporation.
Another California case, Herring v. Fisher, 242
P2d 963 ( 1952) case held that a corporation officer
whose specific duty was to guide the corporation and
seek to further its interests could bind the corporation
by his acts. There, the court held that the defendant,
Fisher, was a spokesman for the corporation and possibly even its alter ego. In his correspondence with the
respondent he never referred to the corporation. The
president did not require written authority to make a
sale or to employ an agent to do so. The court here
also held the executive officer of such a corporation
is more than an agent. He acts and speaks for the corporation in furthering its express objects and may
sell all the properties of this corporation because that
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is the very object of its organization. In this case it was
a corporation which engaged in the sale of properties.
A similar holding was stated in the case of J eppi
v. Brockman Holding Company, 34 Cal 2d 11, 206
P2d 847, 9 ALR 2d 1297. In that case the court recites
the common law rule that the directors of an ordinary
corporation could not dispose of all the assets without
the consent of its stockholders. They cite the California
statute which allows the corporation to dispose of its
assets and wind up its business when authorized by
a majority vote of the outstanding stock, rather than
a unanimous vote. In this case the executive officer of
the corporation, as in our case, agreed to make a sale
with some buyer, entered into the transaction and later
tried to withdraw from the agreement. The buyer
instituted an action to force the sellers to continue with
their agreement and the court upheld the agreement
requiring the sellers to pa~s title to the property. There
was no meeting of the shareholders. In our case there
was a meeting of the shareholders as well as the directors, since they were all one group and the same people.
But, the court in this California case expressly held
that a corporation's sale of all its assets in the ordinary
course of business for which it was organized, without
the stockholders' consent, is not ultra vires. This is
exactly what we have done-had a sale of the corporate
assets in the ordinary course of the corporate purposes.
'Vhen the Grovers found it was to their interest, which
was also the corporation's interest, to sell some assets,
then they, as this California court held, did not need to
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have a stockholders meeting. That case, like ours, involves a statute. The court stated this, page 1302, righthand column:
"The corporation relies upon Section 343 of
the Civil Code, now Section 3901, Corporations
Code, which reads: 'No corporation shall sell ...
all or substantially all of its property and assets
. . · unless under authority of a resolution of
its board of directors and with the approval of
the principal terms of the transaction and the
nature and amount of the consideration by vote
or written consent of (the) shareholders .. .' "
There is no question that the shareholders did not
meet formerly. It was never contended they did, but the
court did hold that where it was clear they were pursuing a corporate policy and interest, that any decision
of the executive officers and the directors was binding
upon the corporation and they would not be allowed
to repudiate a contract on a technicality simply for the
purpose of enforcing the strict letter of the law. Such
a holding would defeat the very intent of the statute
and would create an injustice. The court goes on to
explain why it held as it did and states, page 1303,
lefthand column:
"The provisions of the statute should not be
applied solely upon the basis of the quantity of
the property; the test which determines the question of the necessity for consent of the stockholder
is, 'whether the sale is in the regular course of the
business of the corporation and in furtherance of
the express objects of its existence, or something
outside of the normal and regular course of the
business .... "
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It is the contention of the defendants that the purposes
of the Grover Corporation are buying, selling and exchanging property, which they were doing here.
One of the issues before the court at this time is
the issue of whether o! not a corporation can validly
sell its stock or assets without first holding a shareholders meeting where there is a state statute that such
a meeting be held. That exact issue has been considered
in the American Law Reports at 9 ALR 2d 1306, and
particularly in Section 3 on page 1312 ,Section 3 reads:
"Particular classes of corporations or corporations organized for particular purposes; buying
and selling real estate. Statutes requiring ap- ,
proval by a specified percentage of the stockholders in a corporation in order to validate a
sale of all or part of its business, franchise or
property have been held inapplicable to sales of
all or a part of their real estate by corporations
engaged in a general real-estate business; therefore, such sales have been uphold notwithstanding
the fact that there was no attempt to proceed in
accordance with the terms of such a statute."
Our Section 16-10-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, supports this theory. Then several cases are
cited which hold this very point, that is, that in a certain ·
type of case there is no necessity to comply with the
statutory requirement of first holding a stockholders
meeting because the very purpose for which the corpora ti on was organized is being furthered by the sale
of the assets. There can be no question in our case but
what one of the main purposes for which this corpo-
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ration was organized by Grovers was for the sale of
real estate. Exhibit #10 is the Articles of Incorporation
of the Grover Corporation and Article 3 thereof reads:
"This corporation is organized for the purpose
of engaging in farming and in buying and selling, exchanging, leasing and renting real and
personal property of every kind and description."
(emphasis added)
While the plaintiffs contend that this corporation
is organized primarily for the purpose of farming, they
cannot deny the fact that right in their own Articles
of Incorporation they state that in addition to farming
the corporation is organized for the purpose of buying
and selling real estate and personal property of every
kind and description. Certainly that statement is too
broad to be limited to farming purposes only, for it
clearly goes beyond that limited purpose. It also benefits
the corpora tion shareholders by allowing and proposing
the sale of property when it would so benefit the shareholders.
The ALR Annotation cites cases in California, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio and Wisconsin and a more
recent supplement edition to that annotation found in
I Later Case Service, ALR 2d at page 950 cites additional cases in Washington and California.
All these cases reach the same important conclusion and that is that where the purposes of the corporation are being furthered by the sale, the statutory
requirement that the shareholders meet together to
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hold a meeting to discuss if the sale should be authorized or not is meaningless and need not be complied
with. The Articles of Incorporation of the Grover
Corporation clearly state what its purposes are and
one of them is to sell property.
Looking now to some of these cases that are cited
let us first look at the California case of Bradford v.
Sunset Land and Water Company, 157 P. 20, 30,
Cal. App. 87, which held, where there is a statute declaring that no sale, transfer, etc., of the "business
franchise and property as a whole" of any corporation
in the state should be valid without the consent of the
stockholders of record who hold at least 2/3rds of
the issued and capital stock of the corporation, the
statute was not applicable to a contract by which a
corpora tion engaged in a general real estate business
gave an option for the purchase of real estate belonging
to it.
A very similar holding was in the
of Seeburg v. El Royale Corporation,
I, 128 P2d 362. There the court held
to purchase an apartment house from
was not void even though the consent of
stockholders was not first obtained as
California statute which read:

California case
54 Cal.App.2d
that an option
a corporation
the corporation
required by a

"A corporation must first have a stockholders
meeting before it could dispose of all or substantially all of its property."
That case held the very thing we are trying to point
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out here, that where the purpose of the corporation is
being furthered and effectuated by the sale there is
no reason to require the stockholders to personally grant
approval. At this point let us refer back to the earlier
California case of J eppi v. Brockman Holding Company cited earlier, where the California Supreme Court
held there was no need to meet the requirement for a
stockholders meeting, and that the option granted by
the officers of the corporation to buy real estate was
valid even though the statute expressly required a
stockholders meeting before such sale could be made.
In that said case there was one interesting difference
from the other cases cited and that is that there it was
not a realty company making the sale or a corporation
expressly organized for the purpose of selling real
estate, rather it was organized for the purpose of
disposing of the assets of an estate. The court concluded that the sale was furthering the corporation's
purpose. On page 1314 of this ALR Annotation there
was another very interesting comment in the righthand
column, halfway down, which states:

"It may be noted in this connection that the
principles stated and illustrated above with respect to corporations engaging in the real-estate
business generally has also been applied in a few
cases where, in addition to being organized for
purposes other than the buying and selling of real
estate generally, the corporation was ~uthorized
in connection with its corporate activities to purchase and sell real estate." (emphasis added)
Now, that goes right to the point of our case. The
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plaintiffs contend that their corporation was organized
only for farming purposes, not to buy and sell real
estate. Now, even if that were true we do not agree
that the same rule would apply according to this article.
It cites several cases which have upheld the point that
where even one of the several purposes for which a
corporation was organized was to buy and sell real
estate, even though its primary purpose was for some
other goal, that then the same reasoning applies. They
conclude that in such a case there is no reason to
require a stockholders' meeting to authorize the sale
even though a statute require!) one. For example, the
ashington case of Lange vs. Reservation Mining
and Smelting Co., 48 Wash. 167, 93 P. 208, held that
a corporation which was organized among other things
to buy, sell and deal in mines, had the power to enter
into a contract for the sale of its mines together with
the tools and machinery used in operating them, the
same being all the property owned by the corporation.
This was allowed, notwithstanding the objection of
the minority stockholders. The court pointed out that
the sale did not disrupt the corporation nor was it contrary to the purpose for which the corporation was
formed. The court further stated that on the contrary,
the corporation would be in as good a condition to proceed with the objects it was formed to promote after
the sale as it was before the sale would fulfill one of
its objects and purposes, and that the power of sale
existed by virtue of both the Articles of lncorpora tion
and the general law confirming the management and
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control of the corporate business on the Board of
Trustees. This case was expressly followed in the later
case of Smith v. Flathead River Coal Company, 6u
Wash. 408, 119 P. 858· No single point could be more
important than the conclusions in these cases. Again,
in the California case of Keck Enterprises Inc. vs.
Braunschweiger, in the District Court of California,
108 F.Supp. 925, it was held that where there was a
statute barring the corporate sale of all, or substantially all assets without the authority of the directors
and the consent of the stockholders it did not apply in
a case where the prei)ident of the corporation sold a
major asset, games, because the sale was in the regular
course of business of the corporation and the principal
assets of the corporation was ownership of invention
rights, not of games.
Numerous other cases have upheld the same point,
however, to cite only a few, see for example an Ohio
case, Painter v. Brainard-Cedar Realty Company, 28
Ohio App. 123, 163 N.E. 57, which held that where
there was an 6hio statute forbidding the sale of the
entire property and assets of the corporation, except
when authorized by three-fourths of the directors, and
approval by the holders of three-fourths of the stock,
did not apply to a sale by a corporation which was
organized for the purpose of buying, selling and dealing in real estate. The court then stated that it was
meaningless to require the stockholders or directors to
authorize the very thing that the corporation was organized to do.
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Another case is Tuttle vs. Junior Building Corporation, 227 N.C. 146, 41 SE.2d 365, where the object
for which the corporation was formed was:
"To purchase a certain designated parcel of
real estate, to own, operate, lease, transfer, assign, sell and convey this real property and/ or to
otherwise dispose of the same and to purchase
and/or otherwise acquire real and personal property."
(Almost the same exact wording of the Articles of Incorporation of the Grover Corporation.)
Just as in our case, here the corporation tried to deny
its duty to fulfill a contract for the sale of property )
entered into on its behalf by its executives, because
there had not been a meeting of the stockholders to give
approval to such sale as was required by a statute,
but the court held that the statute was not applicable,
pointing out that under its charter it appeared that
the corporation had general power to buy and sell real
estate as its regular business. The specific mention of
the building and lot in question did not exempt it from
such power or segregate it from such property acquired
generally for such purpose.
In a vVisconsin case, Gottschalk V• Avalon Realty
Company, 249 Wis. 78, 23 NW.2d 606, it held that
there was a legitimate exception to the general rule
which should be made in the case of corporations
created for the purpose of selling, buying, leasing and
otherwise disposing of real estate because that was the
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very purpose for which they were created. In a later
case in Wisconsin, Fontaine v. Brown County Motors
Company, 251 Wis. 433, 29 NW2d, 744, 174 ALR G94,
the court stated:
"We do not agree with the contention that an
ordinary business corporation may not transfer
real property without a majority vote of its stockholders. At the common law, a business corporation other than a real estate corporation was not
permitted to dispose of its entire property exce2t
by unanimous consent of the stockholders, if the
corporation were a solvent going concern. The
same was true of the conveyance of any part of
the corporate property which was essential to a
continuance of the corporate enterprise.
"The basis for the limitation of authority was
that such a conveyance was a substantial abandonment of the business enterprise and contrary to
the implied agreement of the stockholders that
the corporate property would be devoted to the
prosecution of corporate purposes."
As a final case let us look at a New York decision,
lpstein v. Gonneen, 235 App.Div. 33, 256 NYS 49,
which held that a New York statute which required
that there would be a stockholders meeting which would
require a two-thirds vote in favor of allowing the corporation to sell and convey its property rights, privileges and franchises or any interest therein, or any
part thereof, does not apply to a contract for the sale
of real estate by a corporation whose business was
the sale of its own real estate.
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POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT OF SALE \VAS
PREPARED BY THE GROVERS AND THEIR,
ATTORNEY.
The contract that the court by its findings held
was prepared by the Grovers and Attorney E. J. Skeen
is Exhibit #3, dated October lst, 1964 (R. 880 Findings of Fact #5) and not Exhibit #33 dated September
26, 1964, which is referred to in appellants' brief.
The Garns claimed this was brought to their home
place in Fielding on the date it bears by Mr. Arthur,
N. Grover, who claimed his attorney was away and
he wanted something signed up until the final draft
could be prepared by Attorney Skeen. (R. 544, 545,
546, 547, 634, 635 and 636) . They did not know who
made it up. Exhibit #3 was finally prepared and became the contract that is sought to be set aside. Mr. ,
Nelson, the banker; denied that he made it up (Exhibit #33) and claimed he only became aware of it
shortly before the trial (R. 472). Mr. Skeen (R. 771)
claims he saw it for the first time when Mr. Grover
brought it into his office. He claims he has searched 1
his off ice and can't find the original ( R. 772) ; the
present Exhibit #33 being a copy. He admitted on
cross-examination, however, that he does not have complete files, that Mr. Grover had other counsel for a year
or two and took his files ( R. 777) .
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It appears to the writer that Point IV involves
a matter that has no bearing on this lawsuit. It talks
of a contract that was superseded by another that became the official document involved in the action and
that the comment made in regard to Exhibit #33 is
just a smokescreen thrown in, in an attempt to cloud
the issues. We will not pursue it further.

POINT V
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE
WEIGHT
OF
THE
EVIDENCE
AND
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
This court has repeatedly held that where the lower
court heard the matter without the aid of a jury and
had the opportunity to see and observe as well as hear
the witnesses give their testimony, that the findings
of the lower court will not be disturbed unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against its findings, or
there ha~ been a plain abuse of discretion or the lower
court has misapplied proven facts. Bear River State
Bank v. Merrill, 120 P2d 325, IOI Ut. 176; Beezley
v. Beezley, 296 P2d 274, 5 Ut.2d 20; Heiselt V· Heiselt,
349 P2d 175, IO Ut. 2nd 126; Jewell v. Horner, 366
P2d 594, 12 Ut. 2d 328.
We have set out carefully in our statement of facts
references to testimony given at the trial in support
of each and every finding of the court. We believe
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that a careful reading of the record will reveal the fact
that the great weight of the testimony supports the
court's findings.

SUMMARY
We believe the evidence shows that Mr. Grover,
acting for himself and wife, through the corporation
that they owned, obtained a price that was very good.
He in all of the dealings in behalf of the sellers was
sharp and shrewd. He took advantage of the tax he
would have had to pay as the farm would be paid for,
of having a high price per acre, which could be count- ~
ered with the capital gain and a low rate of interest
that he must show as regular income. Prior to this sale he
had had the farm listed with real estate people for approximately a year. Mr. Grover, who has done all of the
business for his wife and himself up to the time of sale,
took care of his business after the sale in the same ,
manner as he had done before. He dealt with different
bankers; sold his produce; did his own banking; brought
other lawsuits; continued to file annual reports for the
corporation. He was sharp and alert and knew what
he was doing. It was not until nearly a year after the '
sale that the family, through the determined efforts
of Norman Grover, finally convinced the parents to try
and set the sale aside. After the family joined forces,
their efforts knew no bounds. The stock manipulation,
that was a'ttempted when the family united for this
purpose, was crude and made in the face of other instru-
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ments that had been made a matter of public record
in the Secretary of State's Office. These instruments in
the Secretary of State's Office had not been taken into
consideration by them but plainly pointed out that a
new issue of stock had taken place and been back-dated.
In attempting to rescind the contract the Grovers were
trying to take this farm away ~rom individuals who,
in good faith, had bought it and who have spent upwards of $45,000.00 for new machinery and since the
purchase have paid even a much greater sum than that
on the purchase price. In addition, they have spent
four good years of their lives in farming and developing,
building and operating this farm.
F::.-om the facts and the equities in the entire matter
the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. The
corporation, Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover,
are just as well off as they ever were: They are receiving and will receive money in equal value to the land
that they sold. By affirming the decision of the lower
court the Garns would be protected from the unwarranted effort made by Norman Grover, a stranger to
the entire transaction to have the sale set aside, and
justice would prevail.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter G. Mann and
Reed W. Hadfield
of Mann and Hadfield
Attorneys for Defendants
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